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due weight to possible prejudice to parties that have relied upon the order granting recognition.”3 
A court reviewing whether to modify or terminate a prior recognition order must therefore ask 
two questions: (1) whether the grounds for granting recognition in the first instance were lacking 
at the time recognition was granted; and (2) whether circumstances have changed such that the 
grounds for granting recognition in the first instance have ceased to exist.4   
Cases addressing modification and termination of prior recognition under §1517(d) are 
scarce. That said, a court’s decision to revisit a prior recognition order is within its discretionary 
powers.5 Further, “[t]he same factors relevant in determining whether to grant recognition are 
therefore relevant in determining whether to terminate a recognition order."6 Consequently, a 
court, in considering a request to modify or terminate recognition, will likely consider: (1) the 
location of the debtor’s center of main interest (“COMI”); (2) whether comity principles weigh 
in favor of modification or termination; (3) whether public policy weighs in favor of 
modification or termination; and (4) whether the previous recognition continues to sufficiently 
protect the interests of all or substantially all creditors.7  
III. Discussion 
 
In re Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. is the leading case addressing modification or 
termination under §1517(d).8 The debtor, Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. (“Coop”), was a 
special financing vehicle for its parent company involved in concurrent insolvency proceedings 
 
3 Id. § 1517(d).  
4 Id.  
5 See In re Loy, 448 B.R. 420 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011) (finding §1517(d)’s plain language discretionary and refusing 
to terminate prior recognition absent clear and complete evidence). 
6 In re Cozumel Caribe, S.A. de C.V., 508 B.R. 330, 335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (refusing to terminate prior 
recognition of Mexican proceeding where questionable conduct of foreign representative not manifestly contrary to 
U.S. public policy). 
7 See id.  
8 578 B.R. 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).  
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
in Brazil and the Netherlands.9 The bankruptcy court subsequently granted the Brazilian foreign 
representative’s chapter 15 recognition petition after determining that Coop’s creditor 
expectations were that Brazil was its COMI because of creditor’s extensive dealings with Coop 
as a special financing vehicle for its parent company.10 Some of Coop’s creditors in the 
Netherlands thereafter petitioned the bankruptcy court claiming that it was required to terminate 
its prior recognition because Coop’s COMI was the Netherlands, not Brazil.11 The bankruptcy 
court declined to terminate its prior recognition after engaging in a two-step analysis.  
First, after reviewing the plain language of §1517(d) and previous case law, the court 
determined that whether to modify or terminate its prior recognition was discretionary relief that 
should only be granted after considering the various factors discussed above.12 Second, the court 
analyzed those various factors, including: (1) whether Coop's COMI had not actually been Brazil 
at the time of recognition; (2) whether circumstances had so changed such that Coop's COMI has 
shifted to the Netherlands because of actions taken by the Netherlands foreign representative; (3) 
whether, in light of those actions, creditor expectations had similarly changed; and (4) whether 
comity principles or public policy warranted terminating its prior recognition of the Brazilian 
proceeding.13 Finding these factors unavailing, the bankruptcy court refused to terminate its prior 
recognition.14  
i. Location of Debtor’s COMI at Time of Recognition  
 
Considering Oi, a party may argue that the bankruptcy court incorrectly determined that 
the recognized foreign proceeding was the debtor's COMI at the time the court granted 
 
9 Id. at 175.  
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 212; accord In re Loy, 448 B.R. at 438. 
13 Id. at 216–35. 
14 Id. at 235 (“Movants have not satisfied their burden of showing that the COMI of Coop has shifted from Brasil to 
the Netherlands based on events after the Prior Recognition Order.”). See also In re Oi S.A., 587 B.R. 253 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2018) (granting subsequent motion to enforce Brazilian restructuring plan). 
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recognition. The primary factors here would be the "nerve center" of the debtor at the time of 
recognition and what creditor expectations were regarding their dealings with the debtor.15 
However, a party will likely face a higher burden here because they are contesting a court's own 
prior recognition determination.  
For example, In re Loy addressed this issue in the context of a pro se debtor who was a 
former owner of a furniture business in England that later declared bankruptcy.16 After the 
bankruptcy court granted recognition to the English insolvency proceeding, the debtor moved 
under §1517(d) to terminate the court's recognition by claiming that the English trustee had 
misrepresented that "his COMI at all relevant times was Hampton, VA, not the United 
Kingdom."17 Like in Oi, the Loy court emphasized that "revisiting a recognition determination is 
. . . within the Court's jurisdiction" and that it was "not limited to considering only the evidence . 
. . available at the time" of recognition.18 That said, despite significant leeway to the pro se 
debtor, the Loy court refused to "afford . . . the extraordinary remedy of revocation of recognition 
without a complete factual record."19 This determination was materially based on the debtor’s 
failure to disclose his relocation to France while the case was ongoing.20  
ii. COMI Shift Between Recognition and §1517(d) Petition  
Alternatively, a party may argue that the debtor’s COMI has shifted under the changed 
circumstances prong of §1517(d). “[A] debtor’s COMI is determined as of the time of the filing 
of the Chapter 15 petition [but]… a court may also look at the time period between initiation of 
the foreign liquidation proceeding and the filing of the Chapter 15 petition.”21  “In the absence of 
 
15 See In re OAS S.A., 533 B.R. 82, 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
16 448 B.R at 424.   
17 Id. at 435.  
18 Id. at 438–39.  
19 Id. at 436.  
20 Id.  
21 Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 714 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2013).   
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evidence to the contrary, the debtor's registered office, or habitual residence in the case of an 
individual, is presumed to be the center of the debtor's main interests.”22 To rebut this 
presumption, a party must show that the debtor’s “head office functions” are carried out in a 
different jurisdiction.23  Factors include “the location of the debtor’s headquarters; the location of 
those who actually manage the debtor; the location of the debtor’s primary assets; the location of 
the majority of the debtor’s creditors…and/or the jurisdiction whose law would apply to most 
disputes.”24  
a. COMI Shift: Foreign Representative Actions 
 Accordingly, under §1517(d), a foreign representative who undertakes substantial actions 
between recognition of a foreign proceeding and a subsequent modification or termination 
petition may shift the debtor’s COMI upon showing that the debtor’s “head office functions” 
have shifted to another jurisdiction.25  
For example, in Suntech, the debtor's COMI was in China when it defaulted on its 
obligations and subsequently commenced a restructuring agreement with its creditors in the 
Cayman Islands because of the flexibility that jurisdiction offered.26 Various U.S. creditors later 
obtained a judgment against its U.S. assets in an involuntary New York insolvency proceeding.27 
In response, the Cayman representatives filed a chapter 15 petition for recognition, which the 
court granted upon finding that the representatives had undertaken substantial restructuring 
 
22 11 U.S.C. § 1516(c); see also 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1506.03 (16th ed. 2013) (defining “registered office” as 
“the place of incorporation or the equivalent for an entity that is not a natural person”). 
23 See In re OAS S.A., 533 B.R. at 82. 
24 In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
25 See In re Creative Fin Ltd., 542 B.R. 498 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (changing state of incorporation insufficient); In 
re Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd., 520 B.R. 399 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (substantial restructuring actions by 
foreign representative shifted COMI). 
26 In re Suntech, 520 B.R. at 405.  
27 Id. at 408–09.  
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activities on the debtor’s behalf.28 Thus, the Cayman representatives’ actions shifted the debtor’s 
COMI from China to the Cayman Islands.29  
 b. COMI Shift: Creditor Expectations 
Similarly, material changes in the expectations of affected creditors between recognition 
of a foreign proceeding and a subsequent §1517(d) petition may also shift the debtor’s COMI.30 
Unlike in Suntech, in Bear Stearns the Southern District upheld the bankruptcy court’s 
determination that the debtor's COMI was in New York, rather than the Cayman Islands, 
considering three key factors.31  First, that no employees or managers were in the Cayman 
Islands.32 Second, that all the debtor's records prior to the Cayman insolvency proceeding were 
in the United States.33 Third, that all the debtor's liquid assets were also located in the United 
States.34  The Bear Stearns court reiterated that §1516(c) "creates no more than a rebuttable 
evidentiary presumption, which may be rebutted notwithstanding a lack of party opposition."35 
Considering the factors previously listed, the court found the presumption that the debtor’s 
COMI was the Cayman Islands rebutted.36  
As Oi demonstrates, this same analysis applies in the context of modifying or terminating 
recognition.37  Indeed, in direct contrast to the actions taken by the Suntech representatives, the 
Oi court emphasized the “significant and pragmatic limitations” on the Netherlands foreign 
 
28 Id. at 417–19.  
29 Id. (listing actions including taking possession of debtor property, handling all restructuring issues and disputes 
with creditors, supervising and opening bank accounts, and reincorporating in Cayman Islands). 
30 See In re Bear Stearns, 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying foreign COMI recognition because of substantial 
objections raised by creditors) (“Bear Stearns”). 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 337.  
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 338.  
35 Id. at 335.  
36 Id. at 339.  
37 See In re Oi, 578 B.R. at 235 (“Movants have not satisfied their burden of showing that the COMI of Coop has 
shifted from Brasil to the Netherlands based on events after the Prior Recognition Order.”). 
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representative in rejecting the petitioner’s claim that the debtor’s COMI had shifted to the 
Netherlands.38  
c. Comity  
 
Comity is another significant factor that courts consider in recognition cases.39 “Federal 
courts generally extend comity whenever the foreign court had proper jurisdiction and 
enforcement does not prejudice the rights of United States citizens or violate domestic public 
policy.”40 Comity factors include whether: (1) creditors of the same class are treated equally; (2) 
liquidators are considered fiduciaries and held accountable; (3) creditors have the right to submit 
claims; (4) liquidators are required to give adequate notice to claimants; (5) provisions for 
creditor meeting exist; (6) foreign insolvency law is prejudicial in favor of its own citizens; (7) 
all assets are before one court for distribution; and (8) provisions for automatic stay and lifting to 
facilitate claims exist.41  
Whether a bankruptcy court grants comity deference to a foreign proceeding depends on 
whether basic fairness and due process were provided to all affected parties in that jurisdiction.42 
In such circumstances, a court may grant deference despite the foreign jurisdiction providing 
relief inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.43  
 
38 Id. at 225.  
39 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (defining comity as recognition one nation affords to the acts of 
another). 
40 In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 404 B.R. 726, 733 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (turning over garnished funds previously 
subjected to domestic attachments to Danish court). 
41 See In re Cozumel, 482 B.R. 96, 114, 115.  (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
42 See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482 cmt. b. (1987) (“A court asked to recognize or enforce 
the judgement…must satisfy itself of the essential fairness of the judicial system under which the judgment was 
rendered.”). 
43 See, e.g., Society of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 987 (10th Cir. 2015) (granting deference to English 
monetary judgment waiving procedural rights of defendants because waivers common in English jurisprudence); In 
re Vitro C.V., 701 F.3d 1031, 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 2012) (refusing to grant recognition to Mexican restructuring 
order including non-debtor releases approved by insiders and without consent of affected creditors); In re Sino 
Forest, 501 B.R. 655 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (granting recognition to Canadian order including third-party releases 
not otherwise available in United States because of similar common law system); In re Metcalfe & Mansfield 
Alternative Investments, 421 B.R. 696, 698 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (same). 
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Like each of these cases, the Oi court applied this comity fairness analysis in finding that 
the “bad-faith motive” by certain Dutch creditors petitioning the court for termination under 
§1517(d) was an independent ground for refusing to terminate its prior recognition.44 Similarly, 
in Cozumel, a previous case addressing termination under §1517(d), the Southern District 
emphasized comity in refusing to terminate its prior recognition of a Mexican proceeding despite 
evidence by a relevant creditor of the foreign representative’s questionable conduct.45 The 
Cozumel court largely reasoned that at the current stage the recognized Mexican foreign 
proceeding was the proper court for adjudicating the issues alleged by the creditor.46  
iii. Public Policy & Sufficient Protection to Creditors 
 
Finally, a court may also consider public policy under §1506, stating that: “[n]othing in 
this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take action governed by this chapter if the action 
would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.”47 
  
 This provision runs in tandem with §1521(a), providing that a court may grant “any 
appropriate relief” that is necessary to: (1) give effect to the purpose of chapter 15; (2) protect 
the assets of debtors; or (3) protect the interests of creditors.48 These two provisions provide the 
framework for chapter 15’s public policy exception for granting, modifying, or terminating 
recognition of foreign proceedings.  
That said, the public policy exception is narrowly construed as a bar to recognition or as a 
basis for modification or termination of a prior recognition.49 Likewise, §1522(a) of the 
 
44 578 B.R. at 240. 
45 508 B.R. at 335. 
46 Id. (stating that “[d]issatisfaction with the rulings of the lower Mexican courts is the proper subject for Mexican 
appellate proceedings”). 
47 11 U.S.C. § 1506.  
48 Id. § 1521(a).  
49 See In re Oi, 578 B.R. at 195 (dismissing public policy concerns because ‘‘Brazilian bankruptcy law meets our 
fundamental standards of fairness and accords with the course of civilized jurisprudence.’’) (quoting In re OAS, 533 
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Bankruptcy Code provides a catch-all requirement to any recognition relief granted by a court 
under chapter 15 by conditioning it on the requirement that relevant creditors’ interests are 
sufficiently protected.50 This relief also applies to §1517(d) modification or termination relief 
under §1522(c) because it is subject to §1522(a)’s sufficient creditor protection requirement.51 
Courts may raise these provisions sua sponte.52 Thus, whether a court is evaluating a debtor’s 
COMI, issues of comity, or concerns of public policy, the requirements of §1522 are usually 
considered.  
IV. Conclusion  
Minimal case law exists regarding modification and termination of prior recognitions 
under §1517(d). Still, as the preceding discussion demonstrates, absent clear evidence of an error 
in a court’s initial recognition determination, a party will likely have to present evidence of 
events so substantial that they, in effect, shift creditor’s expectations of the debtor’s COMI. This 
in turn may satisfy the second prong of §1517(d). Otherwise, a court is unlikely to exercise its 
discretion in granting modification or termination relief absent a showing of substantial 
procedural unfairness to affected creditors or fundamental differences between the foreign 
insolvency regime and the Bankruptcy Code. In those circumstances, relief may be granted under 
§1506’s public policy exception or §1522(a)’s mandate of ensuring sufficient protection to all 
creditors. 
 
B.R. at 103–04) (dismissing public policy concerns over pending Brazilian plan disallowing creditor claims); In re 
Cozumel, 503 B.R. at 337–338 (dismissing public policy concerns over foreign representative’s inconsistent 
representations and non-disclosure of material developments in foreign proceeding) (citing In re Ephedra, 349 B.R. 
333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing public policy concerns over majority creditor approved Canadian resolution 
depriving U.S. claimants of jury trial in pending drug suit against debtor); see also In re Cozumel Caribe, 482 B.R.  
at 115–16 (dismissing public policy concerns over ex parte measures by foreign representative preventing creditors 
from exercising rights against guarantor non-debtor affiliates of the debtor). 
50 11 U.S.C. § 1522(a).  
51 Id. § 1522(c).  
52 Id. (“The court may…at its own motion, modify or terminate such relief.”); see also Jaffe v. Samsung Electronics 
Co., Ltd., 737 F.3d 14, 26 (4th Cir. 2013) (raising §1522(a) sua sponte in conditioning recognition of German 
insolvency proceeding on equal treatment to debtor’s U.S. patents).   
